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Abstract—With the proliferation of face image manipulation
(FIM) techniques such as Face2Face and Deepfake, more fake
face images are spreading over the internet, which brings serious
challenges to public confidence. Face image forgery detection has
made considerable progresses in exposing specific FIM, but it is
still in scarcity of a robust fake face detector to expose face
image forgeries under complex scenarios. Due to the relatively
fixed structure, convolutional neural network (CNN) tends to
learn image content representations. However, CNN should learn
subtle tampering artifacts for image forensics tasks. We propose
an adaptive residuals extraction network (AREN), which serves
as pre-processing to suppress image content and highlight tam-
pering artifacts. AREN exploits an adaptive convolution layer to
predict image residuals, which are reused in subsequent layers to
maximize manipulation artifacts by updating weights during the
back-propagation pass. A fake face detector, namely ARENnet,
is constructed by integrating AREN with CNN. Experimental
results prove that the proposed AREN achieves desirable pre-
processing. When detecting fake face images generated by various
FIM techniques, ARENnet achieves an average accuracy up to
98.52%, which outperforms the state-of-the-art works. When
detecting face images with unknown post-processing operations,
the detector also achieves an average accuracy of 95.17%.
Index Terms—facial image manipulation, passive image foren-
sics, convolutional neural network, residuals extraction network.
I. INTRODUCTION
FACE image is a widely-used biological modality, whichcontains rich and intuitive personal identity information
such as gender, race, age, emotion and health status. However,
face images have vulnerability and weak privacy, which makes
them easy to be forged. Especially over the last three years,
tremendous progresses such as DeepFake, generative models
[1]–[3] and computer graphics (CG) based methods [4] have
made facial image manipulations (FIM) reach photo-realistic
level. This opens the door to many face image applications
such as interactive game, movie industry and photography.
However, FIM techniques might also be intentionally used
for malicious purposes. In June 2019, the MIT Technology
Review reported that the rapid spread of a doctored video, in
which the White House speaker Nancy Pelosi was drunk, has
frightened lawmakers in Washington1. Similar AI-enhanced
synthetic media are also likely to be used in serious scientific
research. Apparently, these FIM techniques bring serious crisis
to social security and public confidence.
1https://www.technologyreview.com/s/613676/deepfakes-ai-congress-
politics-election-facebook-social/.
(a)
(b)
Fig. 1: Can you identify which face image is fake? (a) Real
face images with different resolutions. (b) From left to right,
fake face images generated by Glow, StyleGAN, PGGAN,
Face2Face, StarGAN, respectively.
Existing FIM techniques can be roughly divided into three
categories: identity manipulation, expression manipulation and
attribute transfer. Identity manipulation refers to generating
fake face images of entirely imaginary people [5], or replacing
one face in an image with another face via FaceSwap [6] and
DeepFakes [7]. Expression manipulation refers to generating
face images with specific expressions [2], or transferring facial
expression from the source actor to the target face [4]. For
face attribute transfer, it refers to changing the styles of face
images, such as age, gender, hair color, etc [8]. In recent
three years, face identity manipulation has made great progress
[9]. The state-of-the-art methods such as PGGAN [10] and
StyleGAN [11] can synthesize hyper-realistic fake face images
with the resolution up to 1024×1024. The recently emerging
expression manipulation techniques can generate fake face
images without leaving any perceptible artifacts. Among them,
a few generative models including CDAAE [12], ExprGAN
[13], GANimation [14] and Glow [2] were proposed for ex-
pression manipulation with photo-realistic effects. Face2Face,
which is a well-known CG-based method, animates well the
facial expressions of the target video from a source actor [4].
For face attribute transfer, there also exist some generative
models such as StarGAN [8], DIAT [15], CycleGAN [16],
and IcGAN [17] to change facial attributes. Among them,
StarGAN exploits a generator and a discriminator to obtain
better visual quality than existing methods. Fig. 1 shows
some examples of face images. Apparently, it is difficult for
human eyes to differentiate those fake face images generated
by FIM from real images. As we know, face image is an
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2important form of non-verbal communication, from which we
can perceive true information. If face images are intention-
ally manipulated, it might bring serious influence to people,
especially politicians and public figures. Thus, face image
forgery detection is becoming a key issue to be solved in the
community of image forensics.
Compared with the rapid progress of FIM techniques, fake
face detection is still lagging far behind. Most existing works
were proposed to expose some specific FIM technique [18]–
[22], providing binary classification about the trustworthiness
of face images. Only a few works expose multiple FIM
forgeries [23]. Some works have studied the influence of post-
processing [24]–[27], yet they have not fully addressed fake
face image detection under complex scenarios. Actually, face
images are inevitably compressed or resized before spreading
over social media. To hide manipulation traces, manipulated
face images usually suffer from some post-processing opera-
tions, which might include JPEG compression (JP), Scaling
(SC), Gaussian Blur (GB), Mean Filtering (ME) and Median
Filtering (MED). When the pre-trained detectors are detecting
face images with unknown post-processing operations, there
usually exist drastic performance degradations or they can be
completely invalidated. Thus, the detection of multiple FIM
forgeries under complex scenarios is becoming an urgent task
to be solved. We need to develop a more general and robust
fake face detector.
The conventional image forensics framework is made up
of feature extraction and classification [28], [29]. The ex-
tracted features are usually hand-crafted, which leads to
poor generalization capability. In recent years, Convolutional
Neural Networks (CNN) has provided us an alternative to
address the issue of feature selection, since it can learns
feature implicitly and completes classification automatically
[30]. Note that instead of learning content representation for
image classification tasks, CNN should learn features from
subtle tampering traces for image forensics [31]. Though
CNN has achieved desirable accuracies when detecting copy-
move, ME and JPEG recompression [32]–[34], the existing
CNN forms still have their own constraints. If we want
to further improve detection accuracy, the convolution layer
should be forced to learn features from tampering traces by
improving its standard form. To the best of our knowledge,
there is only one attempt, namely MISLnet [31], to address
this issue. The first convolution layer, which is called as
the Constrained convolution (Constrained-Conv) layer, extracts
low-level residuals for image forgery detection. In essence,
the Constrained-Conv layer resets specific coefficients of the
kernels after each iteration. The extracted residuals are fragile,
which might be lost after passing through many layers. Though
MISLnet provides some insights to improve the CNN model,
there still remain some open questions. First, is it the best
way to reset specific coefficients in the Constrained-Conv layer
after each iteration? Second, can the low-level residuals be
reused to improve the performance of the model?
To address these questions, we propose an Adaptive Resid-
uals Extraction Network (AREN), which serves as pre-
processing to suppress image content. AREN outputs predic-
tion residuals which can characterize manipulation traces, but
the residuals are obtained by subtracting the original image
from the feature map. Thus, the residuals are different from
those in [35], which are input feature map plus residual block
output. For existing image forensics approaches, the general
pipeline is to predict residuals and extract features from them
for classification [36]–[38]. Motivated by this, we propose a
fake face detector, namely ARENnet, to detect multiple FIM
forgeries. ARENnet is constructed by integrating AREN with
CNN. Specifically, the extracted residuals are reused in AREN
to avoid information loss. Then, they are fed into the feature
extraction network to obtain high-level features. The main
works and contributions are summarized as follows.
• A pre-processing module, namely AREN, is specially
designed for the CNN-based image forensics. Different
from the fixed predictors in existing works, AREN pre-
dicts residuals adaptively during back-propagation. Thus,
AREN can provide more discriminative residuals for
image forensics tasks. AREN might serve as the basic
residual predictor, which means that it can be transferred
to the CNN-based models to detect other image forgeries.
• A robust fake face detector, namely ARENnet, is con-
structed by integrating AREN with CNN to expose the
state-of-the-art FIM forgeries. To the best of our knowl-
edge, this is the first attempt towards the detection of
multiple FIM techniques under complex scenarios.
• We simulate the complex scenarios of practical face im-
age forensics as real as possible. A series of experiments
are conducted to prove the effectiveness of the proposed
ARENnet. ARENnet achieves higher detection accuracy
than existing works. In addition, we also explore the way
to improve the generalization ability of the detector.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II summarizes the related works on face image forensics. Sec-
tion III presents the ARENnet for fake face detection. Section
IV reports the experimental results and analysis. Conclusion
is made in Section V.
II. RELATED WORK
Machine learning have been widely-used in fake face detec-
tion [39]. To expose the face-swapping forgery, Zhang et al.
[40] constructed a feature set of bag of words, which provides
distinguishable information into SVM for binary classification.
To detect the Face2Face reenacted facial expression forgery in
videos, Guo et al. [18] exploited both texture-based moment
features and optical flow-based motion features. To expose
the synthesized face images by GAN, Li et al. [21] defined a
similarity index by Chi-square distance to model the disparities
in color components. In addition, Agarwal et al. [41] proposed
a deepfake face video detection approach by exploiting the cor-
relation between facial expressions and movements. However,
these machine learning based works have poor generalization
capability.
In recent years, many deep learning based works have been
proposed to expose AI-generated fake face images [42]–[44].
Afchar et al. [45] proposed a compact CNN model, namely
MesoNet, for facial video forgery detection. It achieved an
average detection accuracy up to 95% on the FaceForensics
3dataset. To detect fake face images by online face-swapping
Apps including SwapMe2 and FaceSwap3, a two-stream net-
work was proposed [46], in which GoogLeNet is trained to
detect tampering artifacts in a face classification stream, and
a patch based triplet network is trained to capture local noise
residuals and camera characteristics as a second stream. Dang
et al. [47] designed a customized CNN to detect face images
generated by PGGAN [10] and BEGAN [48]. Nhu et al. [20]
added a fully connected layer to VGG-Face [49], which is then
fine-tuned to detect fake face images generated by DCGAN
[50] and PGGAN [10]. Mo et al. introduced high pass filter
into CNN to identify the PGGAN-generated face images [19].
Gera et al. [51] also proposed a temporal-aware pipeline to
expose deepfake videos, which achieves an accuracy up to
97%. These deep learning based works need sufficient data and
training time. Ro¨ssler et al. [52] built a FaceForensics dataset
with 500K face images by exploiting the CG-based Face2Face.
Later, an expanded FaceForensics++ [53] dataset was built by
using four manipulation techniques including Face2Face [4],
FaceSwap, DeepFakes 4, and NeuralTextures [54]. Dolhansky
et al. [55] also built a DFDC dataset, which contains 5K videos
generated by two facial forgery techniques. These three open
datasets promote the development of face forensics.
Considering the particularity of face images, some methods
exploited the biological inconsistency between real and fake
faces. Li et al. [56] proposed to expose DeepFake videos by
detecting the rate of eye blinking. Matern et al. [57] exposed
fake face images by exploiting some visual artifacts such as
the defects of reflection details near eyes, and the imprecise
geometry of both nose and teeth. Ciftci et al. [58] presented a
FakeCatcher to detect inauthentic portrait video by exploiting
the biological signals of facial areas. Yang et al. [59] used 3D
head poses to expose AI-generated fake face images. However,
when there exist no obvious biological defects in fake face
images, these methods might be invalidated as well.
Some works have addressed face forensics from new per-
spectives [60], [61]. Xuan et al. [62] improved the detector’s
generalization ability by adding noises in the training stage.
Cozzolino et al. [63] addressed the issue of forensics transfer
among different FIM techniques. Dang et al. [64] considered
the issue of imbalanced samples. Yu et al. [65] proposed to
discriminate fake face images synthesized by different GANs
by their inherent fingerprints. Considering that the training
of DeepFake is time-consuming, Li et al. [66] simulated the
DeepFake-generated negative samples via simple image post-
processing such as GB. Li et al. [67] also disrupted AI face
synthesis with imperceptible adversarial perturbations. These
efforts provide various insights to promote the development of
face forensics towards universal forensics.
III. PROPOSED ARENNET MODEL
The AI-enhanced FIM techniques have enabled fake face
images to be visually indistinguishable from real ones. Mean-
while, CNNs have been widely used in various forensics tasks
2https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/swapme-by-faciometrics/.
3https://github.com/MarekKowalski/FaceSwap/.
4https://github.com/deepfakes/faceswap.
due to their superior performance [63], [68]. The existing CNN
models designed for image forensics can be divided into three
categories: (1) Stacking standard CNN modules for specific
image forensics task [20], [47]; (2) Using hand-crafted feature
extractors such as high pass filter and SRM to extract residual
features, which are then input into CNN for image forensics
[19], [81]; (3) Improving the existing form of the convolution
layer, such as Constrained-Conv [31], to directly learn image
tampering traces.
Existing face image forensics works exploited either hand-
crafted features or standard CNN to learn features. However,
the existing CNN-based works have no explicit restrictions on
the convolution layer to learn features from tampering traces.
In this paper, we specifically design a pre-processing module,
namely AREN, to predict residuals. Then, a robust fake face
detector, namely ARENnet, is proposed to learn discriminative
features from residuals. Fig. 2 is the architecture of the pro-
posed ARENnet model. ARENnet can robustly detect multiple
FIM forgeries even with various post-processing.
A. AREN
Some existing works learn features from prediction residuals
such as SRM [69], SPAM [70] and median filter residuals [71].
They firstly generate a set of predicted pixel value via a fixed
predictor f(·). Then, the prediction residuals R is obtained by
subtracting the original pixel value from the predicted pixel
value. That is,
R = f(I)− I (1)
where I is the input image. Then, the prediction residuals are
used as low-level features to construct high-level features for
image forensics.
To mimic the above pipeline, AREN is specifically designed
to automatically learn prediction residuals. Then, CNN is used
to learn high-level features from prediction residuals due to its
strong feature representation capability. As shown in Fig. 2,
the first convolution layer (Conv 1) is used to predict the pixel
value as follows.
Fj =
n∑
i=1
Ii ∗ ωij + bj (2)
where Fj is the jth feature map which is output by the Conv
1 layer, Ii ∗ ωij represents the convolution between the ith
channel of the input image I and the ith channel of the jth
convolutional kernel in Conv 1, and bj is the bias term of the
jth convolutional kernel. Then, the prediction residuals Fres
are obtained by
Fres = Fj − I (3)
Apparently, the way to obtain prediction residuals in Equation
(3) is almost the same as Equation (1). The only difference is
that AREN can adaptively update its weights. Specifically, the
initial coefficients of the Conv 1 layer are randomly set. Then,
the weights are updated by an iterative algorithm during the
back-propagation pass [72]. In this paper, stochastic gradient
descent (SGD) is used to train the model. The rules for iterative
updates are defined as follows.
5ω(n)ij = ε
∂E
∂ω
(n−1)
ij
− θ1 · 5ω(n−1)ij + θ2 · ε · ω(n−1)ij (4)
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Fig. 2: ARENnet: our proposed ARENnet architecture. Given an input RGB image, we use the Conv 1 in AREN to obtain the
feature map of image. Then, the original image is subtracted from the feature map in Conv 1 to extract the low-level prediction
residuals Fres. Furthermore, the stable higher-level residuals, namely Freu, are obtained by reusing the Fres. Next, the Freu are
passed to the subsequent convolution layers for hierarchical feature extraction to obtain high-level forensics features. Finally,
we use fully connected layers and softmax function to classify the images. MaxPool: Max Pooling Layer; ReLU: Rectified
Linear Unit; BN: Batch Normalization; FC: Fully Connected Layer; F1 and F2 represent the feature maps of the previous
layer, respectively.
ω
(n)
ij = ω
(n−1)
ij −5ω(n)ij (5)
where 5 denotes the gradient, ω(n)ij is the weight of the ith
channel of the jth convolutional kernel in the nth layer, E is
the loss function, and ε is the learning rate. Furthermore, we
use the momentum θ1 and the decay θ2 to accelerate model
training [73]. In the iterative training process, its goal is to
minimize the average loss E between true label and network
output to make it converge [74]. AREN iteratively adjusts the
weights to obtain better prediction residuals. The average loss
E is defined as
E =
1
x
x∑
i=1
n∑
k=1
L
(k)
i log(y
(k)
i ) (6)
where L(k)i is the true label of the i
th image in the kth class,
y
(k)
i is the network output, x is the number of training sample,
and n is the number of neurons in the output layer.
However, the residuals Fres extracted by the Conv 1 layer
are fragile. If they are used directly, it might still lead to
unstable training. To obtain stable prediction residuals, we
borrow the idea of feature reusing by DenseNet [75]. Let c1
and c2 be two convolution layers, and Hc1,c2(·) denote the
composite function of c1 and c2. Let [β1, β2, ..., βn] be the
concatenation of the n feature maps. Thus, the residuals Fres
is passed into Conv 2 and Conv 3 to obtain the intermediate
feature map
F1 = Hc2,c3(Fres) (7)
The feature map obtained by concatenating F1 and Fres is
passed to Conv 4 and Conv 5, which can be expressed as
F2 = Hc4,c5([F1, Fres]) = Hc4,c5([Hc2,c3(Fres), Fres]) (8)
Finally, we obtain the stable residuals as follows.
Freu = [F2, Fres, [Hc2,c3(Fres), Fres]] (9)
AREN suppresses image content and obtains stable pre-
diction residuals. Fig. 3 compares the prediction residuals
obtained by different filters after 100 and 10,000 times of
iterations. We can observe that when AREN iterates 100
times, most image contents are not suppressed. However, when
the iteration times reach 10,000, most image contents are
suppressed whereas keeping well manipulation traces. Note
that different from the fixed predictor in existing works, AREN
can adaptively learn prediction residuals, which are more
suitable for image forensics, via the back-propagation pass.
B. Network Architectures
For the proposed ARENnet, most of the convolution layers
adopt 3×3 kernels, since it has been claimed that the 3×3
convolutional kernels outperforms larger kernels [76]. Because
there are three color channels in the input images, the Conv 1
layer uses three convolutional kernels to obtain the feature
maps, respectively. Then, the prediction residuals Fres are
obtained by subtracting the above feature maps from the
original image. Let the input image be of size 128×128.
As shown in Fig. 2, F1 and Fres are firstly concatenated to
obtain feature maps, whose dimension is 128×128×6. To fully
exploit the features of the previous layer, the number of the
convolutional kernels in the successive layer should not be less
than the number of channels of the input feature map. Thus, six
convolutional kernels are used for Conv 4 and Conv 5. Table
I summarizes the parameters of ARENnet. In Section IV-C,
we also analyze the influence of the number of convolutional
kernels.
AREN obtains desirable prediction residuals Freu. Instead
of directly using them as the features for image forensics, we
design a hierarchical feature extraction (HFE) module. Freu
is fed into the HFE module to learn high-level features for
image forensics. Specifically, the HFE module is made up of
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Fig. 3: The output of the six filters in AREN at different iterations. As the number of iterations increases, the feature map
obtained by the AREN gradually suppresses the image content and retains the trace features.
four convolution layers, four max-pooling layers (MaxPool),
four ReLU activation functions (ReLU), and three batch nor-
malization (BN) layers.
For the four convolution layers, we gradually increase the
number of the convolutional kernels. That is, Conv 6=24, Conv
7=48, Conv 8=64, and Conv 9=128. For the convolutional
kernels, small stride can extracts more abundant features than
large stride. Thus, the stride of each convolution layer is set
to 1. Before feeding the feature maps into the classification
module, another convolution layer, namely Conv 9, is intro-
duced to achieve cross-channel interaction [77]. Different from
the previous convolution layers, the Conv 9 layer adopts a
1×1 kernel. It learns the linear combination of those features
located in the same location but different channels.
Each convolution layer is followed with other types of
layers, which include MaxPool, ReLU and BN. The MaxPool
layer retains the most representative information (i.e., the
maximum value) within the sliding window. It also reduces the
dimension of feature maps, and introduces network nonlinear-
ity to prevent over-fitting. For the four MaxPool layers, they
use the same kernel size of 3×3. To reduce the dimension of
feature maps, the stride of each MaxPool layer is set to 2. The
ReLU layer is introduced to increase network nonlinearity and
overcome gradient vanishing. Thus, the ARENnet model can
approximate any nonlinear function. Note that these nonlinear
operations including MaxPool and ReLU are not introduced
into AREN, which prevents the learned residuals from being
destroyed by them. To accelerate training [78], the BN layer
is also used in the ARENnet model to regularize the output
of the convolution layers.
Finally, the learned deep features are passed into the clas-
sification module, which is made up of three fully connected
layers. The first two fully connected layers, which learn the
associations among deep features, have 300 neurons, respec-
tively. The neurons in the last fully connected layer, whose
outputs correspond to the real face image and possible face
image manipulations.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
A. Experimental Settings
Most existing works provide only binary classification about
the trustworthiness of face images, without considering more
complex scenarios in practical forensics. In the experiments,
TABLE I
SPECIFICATION OF THE ARENnet. “CONV”, “MAXPOOL” AND “FC”
CORRESPOND TO THE VARIABLES IN FIG. 2
Configuration
Layers Kernel sizes Kernel quantities Strides Output sizes
Conv 1 3×3 3 1 128×128
Conv 2 3×3 3 1 128×128
Conv 3 3×3 3 1 128×128
Conv 4 3×3 6 1 128×128
Conv 5 3×3 6 1 128×128
Conv 6 3×3 24 1 128×128
MaxPool 3×3 \ 2 64×64
Conv 7 3×3 48 1 62×62
MaxPool 3×3 \ 2 31×31
Conv 8 3×3 64 1 29×29
MaxPool 3×3 \ 2 14×14
Conv 9 1×1 128 1 14×14
MaxPool 3×3 \ 2 7×7
FC 1: 300-dimension
FC 2: 300-dimension
Softmax Function
we simulate some complex scenarios as real as possible to
verify the effectiveness of the proposed ARENnet model. We
conduct four groups of experiments. First, ARENnet is used
to detect multiple FIMs. Second, we discuss the design of the
ARENnet model. Third, some comparisons are made among
ARENnet and the state-of-the-art works. Fourth, we explore
the way to improve the robustness of ARENnet in complex
scenarios.
Datasets. To conduct the above experiments, we firstly build
a hybrid fake face (HFF) dataset 5, which contains eight types
of face images. For real face images, three types of face images
are randomly selected from three open datasets. They are low-
resolution face images from CelebA [79], high-resolution face
images from CelebA-HQ [10], and face video frames from
FaceForensics [52], respectively. Thus, real face images under
internet scenarios are simulated as real as possible. Then, some
most representative FIM techniques, which include PGGAN
[10] and StyleGAN [11] for identity manipulation, the CG-
based Face2Face [4] and Glow [2] for face expression ma-
nipulation, and StarGAN [8] for face attribute transfer, are
selected to produce fake face images. Note that since StarGAN
can transfer facial attributes such as hair color (black, blond,
brown) gender (male or female) and age (young or old) to
5https://github.com/EricGzq/Hybrid-Fake-Face-Dataset
6TABLE II
THE DETAILS OF HFF DATASETS
Data Type Description Image Size Corpus Size
Real Face Images
CelebA Low-resolution face images 178×218 25k
CelebA-HQ High-resolution face images 1024×1024 10k
YouTube-Frame Face video frames Random size 25k
Fake Face Images
PGGAN A generative model based
identity manipulation technique.
1024×1024 10k
StyleGAN 1024×1024 10k
Glow
A generative model based
expression manipulation technique.
256×256 25k
Face2Face
A CG-based expression
manipulation technique.
Random size 25k
StarGAN
A generative model based
attribute transfer technique.
256×256 25k
other domains, five types of face attributes are manipulated via
StarGAN. It has been claimed that face images with different
attributes share the same artifacts or fingerprints when they are
generated by the same GAN [65]. We mark these images with
different attributes as StarGAN-generated. Table II summa-
rizes the details of the HFF dataset. In addition, the open Face-
Forensics++ [53] dataset is used for experiments. There are 1k
original video sequences, which are manipulated by four FIM
techniques including Deepfakes, Face2Face, FaceSwap and
NeuralTextures. The tampered videos are further compressed
with two quality levels, namely high quality videos (HQ) and
low quality videos (LQ). For each compressed video, ten face
frames are extracted. Thus, there are totally 40k face images
for training and 10k face images for testing.
Evaluation Criterion. Image forgery detectors are usually
evaluated by classification accuracy. In our multi-classification
tasks, since the distribution of data is roughly balanced, we
also use classification accuracy for performance evaluation. To
further evaluate the performance gains brought by different
AREN design selections, the relative error reduction (RER)
[31] is also used as performance evaluation metrics. Let E1
and E2 be the numbers of errors for two detectors (E1 > E2).
RER is defined as RER = (E1 − E2)/E1.
Baseline Models. We choose some state-of-the-art works as
the baselines for comparisons. They are summarized below.
• Meso-4 [45]: It exploits the mesoscopic properties of face
images for facial forgery detection.
• Hand-Crafted-Res [19]: Three high pass filters are used
as pre-processing to extract hand-crafted features. The
parameters with the best performance are used for com-
parisons.
• MISLnet [31]: It uses the Constrained-Conv layer, which
can suppress image content and adaptively learn low-level
residual features for universal forensics.
• XceptionNet [80]: For the FaceForensics++ dataset,
XceptionNet achieved the best performance [53].
• Model-base: To prove the gains brought by AREN, it is
removed from the ARENnet model. The rest network is
called the Model-base here.
• Hand-Crafted-Res-Model-base: We use the hand-crafted
feature extractor in [19] to replace AREN.
• Constrained-Conv-Model-base: AREN is replaced by the
Constrained-Conv in [31].
• SRM-Model-base: AREN is replaced by the SRM filter
kernels in [81].
Implementation Details. The ARENnet model is imple-
mented under the Caffe framework [82]. We convert all face
images in the datasets into the LMDB format and then resize
them into 128×128 for use in Caffe. When training on the HFF
dataset, each forensics model has 10 training epochs. Since
fewer frames are extracted from the FaceForensics++ dataset,
each model has 20 epochs when trained on this dataset. We
record the detection accuracies on the testing set after every
1000 iterations. Two Nvidia GeForce GTX 1080 Ti GPUs are
used to train the model.
B. Detection of multiple FIM forgeries
Since it is relatively easy to detect fake face images gener-
ated by some specific FIM technique, the proposed detector is
used to expose multiple FIM techniques simultaneously. That
is, each type of face images are randomly selected from the
HFF dataset and divided into three sub-datasets for training
(75%), validation (5%), and testing (20%), respectively. Note
that test images have never appeared in the training set and the
validation set. In the experiments, there are about 116k face
images for training, which include real images with different
resolutions and five types of fake images. When training the
ARENnet model, SGD is used for iterative optimization, and
we set the momentum θ1 = 0.95 and the decay θ2 = 0.005.
The learning rate is defined as
ε = εb × γb( αN )c (10)
where εb is the basic learning rate, N is the fixed step size,
α denotes current iteration, and bc denotes rounding down.
Their initial values are as follows: εb = 0.001, γ = 0.5, N =
1000. With the increment of the iteration times, ε decreases
periodically. The batch size is set to 64. Each training epoch
requires 1,817 iterations.
The confusion matrixes of Model-base and ARENnet are
reported in Table III and Table IV, respectively. Their average
detection accuracies are 96.16% and 98.52%, respectively. We
can observe from Table III that the false detection rate between
PGGAN and CelebA-HQ is high. Actually, two types of face
images share similar textures. They are difficult to be detected,
especially when they are resized into 128×128. For Face2Face
and YouTube-Frame, there also exist the same phenomenon.
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CONFUSION MATRIX FOR IDENTIFYING VARIOUS TYPES OF MANIPULATIONS USING MODEL-BASE
THE ASTERISKS “*” REPRESENTS THE VALUE ARE BELOW 1%
Predicted class
The class
CelebA CelebA-HQ YouTube-Frame Glow StarGAN PGGAN StyleGAN Face2Face
CelebA 99.48% * * * * * * *
CelebA-HQ * 87.05% * * * 11.90% * *
YouTube-Frame * * 92.28% * * * * 7.62%
Glow * * * 99.90% * * * *
StarGAN * * * * 99.74% * * *
PGGAN * 19.35% * * * 80.25% * *
StyleGAN * * * * * * 99.80% *
Face2Face * * 1.98% * * * * 97.98%
TABLE IV
CONFUSION MATRIX FOR IDENTIFYING VARIOUS TYPES OF MANIPULATIONS USING ARENNET
THE ASTERISKS “*” REPRESENTS THE VALUE ARE BELOW 1%
Predicted class
The class
CelebA CelebA-HQ YouTube-Frame Glow StarGAN PGGAN StyleGAN Face2Face
CelebA 99.56% * * * * * * *
CelebA-HQ * 95.30% * * * 3.45% * *
YouTube-Frame * * 97.68% * * * * 2.10%
Glow * * * 99.92% * * * *
StarGAN * * * * 99.66% * * *
PGGAN * 8.50% * * * 91.45% * *
StyleGAN * * * * * * 99.85% *
Face2Face * * * * * * * 99.38%
TABLE V
THE COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT RESIDUAL
EXTRACTION METHODS
Methods Accuracy
Hand-Crafted-Res-Model-base [19] 97.50%
Constrained-Conv-Model-base [31] 95.24%
SRM-Model-base [81] 97.49%
ARENnet 98.52%
Note that when AREN is added into Model-base, which turns
into ARENnet, the false detection rate is greatly reduced.
We also makes comparisons among different residual extrac-
tion methods including Hand-Crafted-Res, Constrained-Conv,
SRM and AREN. They are followed with the same basic CNN
model (Model-base) for experiments. Table V compares the
experimental results achieved by different residual extraction
methods. ARENnet achieves the highest accuracy of 98.52%,
which proves that AREN achieves the best residual extraction
capability. The reasons behind this are summarized as follows.
Both Hand-Crafted-Res and SRM use the fixed filter to extract
residuals, Constrained-Conv resets specific coefficients after
each iteration, whereas AREN adaptively updates the coeffi-
cients during the back-propagation pass to predict residuals.
AREN also introduces feature reusing to improve detection
accuracy.
C. Design Selection of the ARENnet Model
The CNN model has direct impacts on detection perfor-
mance. For the ARENnet model, its AREN design is also im-
portant, since AREN learns prediction residuals for forensics.
Actually, AREN is very flexible with the following issues to
be further investigated by experiments: (1) Are the residual
features Fres better for forensics than image data itself? (2)
Whether reusing Fres will improve the ARENnet or not? (3)
TABLE VI
IDENTIFICATION RATE FOR DIFFERENT CNN MODELS
Models Description
Average
Accuracy
RER
ARENnet \ 98.52% -
Model-base Remove the AREN 96.16% 61.46%
Modified
AREN 1
Image data is used instead of
residual features Fres
97.14% 48.25%
AREN 2 Fres is not reused 97.46% 41.73%
AREN 3 Conv 4 = 3 and Conv 5 = 3 97.42% 42.64%
AREN 4 Conv 4 = 12 and Conv 5 = 12 97.88% 30.19%
AREN 5
5×5 convolutional
kernel as the predictor
97.81% 32.42%
AREN 6 Remove Conv 3 and Conv 5 98.29% 13.45%
Other Net 7
All pooling functions are
replaced by average pooling
96.85% 53.02%
Net 8
The 1×1 convolutional kernel
in Conv 9 is replaced by 3×3 98.36% 9.76%
TABLE VII
IDENTIFICATION RATE FOR DIFFERENT FORENSICS MODELS
ON HFF DATASET
Methods Raw JP60 ME5 Average
Meso-4 [45] 80.76% 67.76% 62.40% 70.31%
Hand-Crafted-Res [19] 90.54% 73.81% 74.99% 79.78%
MISLnet [31] 93.76% 86.32% 79.06% 86.38%
XceptionNet [80] 97.17% 78.62% 90.88% 88.89%
ARENnet 98.52% 91.02% 92.42% 93.99%
How many kernels are appropriate for Conv 4 and Conv 5? (4)
Is 3×3 convolutional kernel in the first layer better than 5×5
convolutional kernel? (5) What is the effect of the convolution
layer on AREN?
To address the above issues, we have made some changes
to AREN, which are summarized as Fig. 4. For the ARENnet
model itself, we further discuss two issues: (1) The pooling
layer. As we know, there are two common pooling strategies,
namely max pooling and average pooling. Since ARENnet
adopts max pooling for all the pooling layers, it will be
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Fig. 4: The proposed AREN and the six modified versions. The gray dotted line indicates the removed part, and the blue font
indicates the modified parameter.
replaced with average pooling for experiments. (2) The 1×1
convolution layer. Its main purpose is to achieve cross-channel
interaction and information integration [77]. To verify the 1×1
convolutional kernel in Conv 9, it will be replaced with the
3×3 convolutional kernels. To make fair comparisons, We use
the same datasets described in Section IV-B for experiments.
The ARENnet model after each modification is trained for 10
epochs. The batch size is 64, and each epoch requires 1,817
iterations.
Table VI reports the average detection accuracy and RER
for the proposed ARENnet model with different structures or
parameters. From it, we have the following observations. First,
AREN serves as an effective pre-processing module for the
ARENnet model, since it extracts low-level residual features
suitable for image forensics. If image data is directly used for
feature learning, the detection accuracy will decrease 1.38%.
Second, for the convolutional kernels in the first layer, the size
of 3×3 is better than the size of 5×5, which improves the
detection accuracy about 0.71%. A bigger receptive field does
not lead to better detection accuracy, and 3×3 convolutional
kernels are sufficient for excellent feature extraction. Third, it
is a nice choice to use two convolution layers between two
concatenation operations. The experimental results prove that
two convolution layers are more stable than one convolution
layer. Fourth, max pooling is more preferable than average
pooling for the ARENnet, simply because it improves the de-
tection accuracy about 1.67%. Finally, the 1×1 convolutional
kernel in the Conv 9 layer improves 0.16% detection accuracy
than the 3×3 convolutional kernels, which benefits from the
cross-channel interaction and information integration.
D. Comparisons with State-of-the-art works
Comparisons are made among ARENnet and some state-
of-the-art works. Note that because Hand-Crafted-Res [19]
and MISLnet [31] are designed for other forensics tasks, they
can not converge for our forensics task. Thus, we replace the
TABLE VIII
IDENTIFICATION RATE FOR DIFFERENT FORENSICS MODELS
ON FACEFORENSICS++ DATASET
Methods HQ LQ Average
Meso-4 [45] 42.30% 35.67% 38.99%
Hand-Crafted-Res [19] 66.16% 40.65% 53.41%
MISLnet [31] 69.92% 55.28% 62.60%
XceptionNet [80] 48.82% 42.37% 45.60%
ARENnet 79.05% 56.31% 67.68%
initialization method Gaussian with Xavier for Hand-Crafted-
Res, and we adjust the step size to 1000 for MISLnet. We use
the same dataset described in Section IV-B for experiments. To
hide the traces left by various FIMs, JP and ME are conducted
on this dataset as post-processing, respectively. The quality
factor of JP is set to 60 (JP60), and the kernel size of ME is
set to 5×5 (ME5). Table VII reports the detection accuracies
under three scenarios. We can observe that for most detectors,
both JP60 and ME5 greatly degrades the detection accuracies.
However, ARENnet achieves much better accuracies under
three scenarios.
Another experiment is also conducted on the FaceForen-
sics++ dataset. For each real face image, there are four forged
face images. Since these images are obtained from compressed
videos, they have poor qualities. We detect five types of face
images, and the experimental results are reported in Table VIII.
ARENnet still achieves the best detection accuracies
E. Detection Robustness
When face images are spreading over the internet, they
usually suffer from some image manipulations with various
parameters. It is almost impossible for a face image forgery
detector to learn from fake face images under various scenar-
ios. For the ARENnet model, its generalization capability is
worthy of further investigation. To further explore the way to
improve the detection robustness under complex scenarios, we
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PARAMETER LIST OF IMAGE OPERATIONS
Image Operations Parameters
Spatial Filtering
Mean Filtering (ME) kernel size: 3×3, 5×5, 7×7
Gaussian Filtering (GB) kernel size: 3×3, 5×5, 7×7; Standard deviation: 0
Median Filtering (MED) kernel size: 3×3, 5×5, 7×7
Spatial Enhancement Gamma Correction (GC) gamma: 0.6, 0.8, 1.0, 1.2, 1.4, 1.6, 1.8, 2.0
Lossy Compression JPEG Compression (JP) quality factor: 60-90
JPEG Compression 2000 (JP2) compression ratio: 2.0-8.0
Resampling Scaling (SC)
up-sampling (%): 1, 3, 5, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90
down-sampling (%): 1, 3, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 45
TABLE X
CONFUSION MATRIX FOR VERIFYING THE GENERALIZATION ABILITY
USING ARENNET.
Testing Set
Training
Set
Raw JP60 JP-mix ME5 ME-mix Average
Raw 98.52% 76.41% 76.41% 75.37% 77.11% 81.54%
JP60 90.19% 91.02% 87.43% 54.61% 59.40% 76.53%
JP-mix 93.67% 88.78% 90.33% 69.81% 73.29% 83.18%
ME5 74.66% 47.57% 55.52% 92.42% 87.87% 71.61%
ME-mix 91.67% 65.53% 67.45% 90.07% 90.74% 81.09%
TABLE XI
IDENTIFICATION RATE OF ARENNET TRAINING ON MIXED DATA.
Training on mixed data
Small Middle Large
Raw 95.03% 95.36% 96.32%
JP60 85.81% 86.46% 88.52%
JP-mix 86.35% 86.87% 89.31%
ME5 87.66% 91.92% 91.35%
ME-mix 88.52% 92.05% 92.82%
Average 88.67% 90.53% 91.66%
made the following two assumptions. (1) By applying some
post-processing operations to face image data, can the detector
learn essential differences among various FIMs to improve its
generalization capability? (2) Compared with single parame-
ter, can the post-processing operation with mixed parameters
improve the generalization capability of the detector.
To address the above assumptions, some widely-used image
operations are performed on the HFF dataset to simulate face
images spreading over the internet. Table IX summarizes the
parameters of these image operations. Note that if the dataset
has been suffered from a specific image operation with mixed
parameters, it is denoted as ‘image operation’ plus ‘-mix’,
such as JP-mix, ME-mix, etc. We select two representative
image operations, namely JP and ME, for experiments. Lossy
compression can easily confuse the judgment of the detector
by reducing image quality. Spatial filtering can hide image
details such as manipulation artifacts by blurring the image.
They are selected to destroy the traces left in face images by
different FIM forgeries. There are five types of face images,
which include original face images (Raw), JP60 compressed
images (JP60), JP-mix compressed images (JP-mix), ME5
filtered images (ME5), and ME-mix filtered images (ME-mix),
respectively. In the experiments, the detector is firstly trained
with one type of face images, and then the pre-trained model
is tested with the other four types of face images.
Table X reports the confusion matrixes when ARENnet are
testing five types of face images. From it, we can observe that
the detector trained on JP is also effective when detecting Raw
TABLE XII
VERIFY THE GENERALIZATION ABILITY OF THE ARENNET.
Operation type Training on mixed data
Small Middle Large
Spatial filtering GB-mix 92.07% 94.57% 96.06%
MED-mix 92.22% 94.75% 95.05%
Spatial enhancement GC-mix 88.01% 91.89% 93.52%
Lossy compression JP2-mix 94.64% 94.89% 95.90%
Resampling SC-mix 94.09% 94.82% 95.34%
Average 92.21% 94.18% 95.17%
and JP, while the detector trained on ME achieves desirable
accuracy when detecting Raw and ME. Furthermore, though
JP and ME are two distinct image operations to manipulate
images, we can still observe that the image operations with
mixed parameters enable the detector to learn more discrimi-
native features, and thus improve the generalization ability.
We also select face images from Raw, JP-mix and ME-mix
datasets with the same proportion to construct Small, Middle
and Large mixed datasets, respectively. The ARENnet model is
trained on the mixed training datasets of 124k, 165k, and 372k
face images, respectively. Then, the trained detector is used to
identify Raw, JP, JP-mix, ME, and ME-mix, respectively. Table
XI reports the experimental results. The detection accuracies
also increase with the increase of training data. Their average
accuracies are 88.67%, 90.53%, and 91.66%, respectively.
For the generalization capability, there is still a question
left: whether the detector trained by the above method can
detect face images with other unknown operations? To verify
this, the trained ARENnet is tested to detect some other types
of face images, such as GB-mix, MED-mix, GC-mix, JP2-
mix, and SC-mix. The experimental results are reported in
Table XII. The average accuracy is 95.17%. That is, ARENnet
achieves desirable generalization capability, especially when
it is trained on the large dataset. This proves that training the
detector with those face images after image operations with
mixed parameters is an effective strategy to enhance detection
robustness, since the detector can learn more discriminative
features from them.
V. CONCLUSION
The latest AI-enhanced fake face images can achieve photo-
realistic visual qualities, which are quite challenging to be
detected. In this work, we addressed fake face image de-
tection under complex scenarios. Due to the relatively fixed
structure, there are some limitations for the existing CNN-
based works. We proposed a simple yet effective AREN
module as pre-processing. AREN exploits the convolution
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layer to serve as a predictor to obtain image residuals. The
weights are updated adaptively during the back-propagation
pass. In subsequent layers, the prediction residuals are reused
to maximize manipulation traces. We also designed a fake
face detector, namely ARENnet, by integrating AREN with
CNN. That is, the prediction residuals obtained by AREN
are fed into CNN to learn more discriminative features. The
proposed ARENnet model was systematically validated by a
series of experiments. The experimental results showed that
ARENnet achieved superior detection accuracy and desirable
generalization capability. Compared with MISLnet, ARENnet
improved detection accuracy about 4.76% on average when
testing on the HFF dataset. This mainly benefits from the
AREN, which is much better for residual extraction than
Constrained-conv and SRM. Some common post-processing
operations are selected to simulate the practical forensics under
complex scenarios. We have also explored the way to improve
the detector’s robustness. It is worthy of mention that AREN
might serve as a basic residual predictor for other image
forensic tasks. For future work, we will further improve the
robustness of the detector under complex scenarios.
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